Portugal: Far-Right and Practices of Memory
Dr. Bruno Madeira, CITCEM/University of Porto
Andreia Nunes, University of Porto
Margarida Malta, IM Cultural
When, at the turn of the 20th century into the 21st, the post-fascist far-right phenomenon suddenly gained media attention and significant electoral expression, the Iberian Peninsula seemed relatively immune to the emergence of significant parties or movements from this political camp. For years, the Iberian exception was talked about as if it were a situation that would never change. In fact, the durability of the Portuguese and Spanish fascist regimes, the short period of time since their overthrow, the collective memory of the violence and misery caused by the dictatorships and the youth of the Iberian democracies seemed to point to the impossibility of the emergence/recruitment of local far-right parties. In the case of Portugal, unlike the Spanish state, apart from the demonstrations on Portugal Day (10 June) and Independence Restoration Day (1 December) at the end of the 1970s and the celebration of the memory and legacy of Salazar and the Estado Novo by far-right parties and publications, which went into crisis and ended up disappearing after the Democratic Alliance – a coalition of liberal right parties – won an absolute majority, no one seemed willing to positively evoke the Estado Novo or claim to be the heir to Salazarism.
In fact, the associative, party and terrorist networks that the far right set up in the post-25 April 1974 period began to give way to the weight of political pragmatism, the reduction or cut-off of financial and logistical support and the turn of the main cadres towards metapolitical intervention through publications aimed at the intellectual milieu, intervention in think tanks and participation in the mainstream media. Thus, apart from a few radicals who were never satisfied with the overthrow of the Estado Novo and the implementation of democracy, the neo-Nazi groups that formed in Portugal from the mid- 1980s onwards tended to represent a break with the generation that was forged in the nationalist and imperialist upsurge motivated by the Colonial War (1961-1974) and in the fight against Marcelo Caetano’s reformism. It will be a younger, smaller and more radical militant base, whose main references will no longer be those of Salazarism and integralism but of the Anglo-Saxon neo-Nazi movements. Also from a class point of view, the new far-right movements will try to counter the elitist social matrix and, above all through music and a culture of violence, appeal to young people from the suburbs and the middle and lower classes.
More geared towards action and semi-clandestine activity, these groups should have taken more care to evoke the historical legacy of Salazarism in the public arena. We had to wait until the National Renewal Party (PNR) was founded in 2000 for the old and new generations to come together in a common organisation. Linked to the creation and direction of the new Party, we will find names that had already stood out as organic intellectuals of the far right before and after the Revolution. Neo-Nazi cadres were also incorporated into this new organisation as its armed wing and/or youth organisation. It is precisely the PNR that will recover the memory of Salazarism and promote it as a golden period in national history. The party will also promote pilgrimages to Salazar’s grave on the anniversaries of his birth and death – a tradition that more recent movements, such as Nova Portugalidade in the person of its president, Rafael Pinto Borges (a former militant of the Social Democratic Centre and current Chega militant), have maintained and sought to promote.
On the other hand, the dismissal of university professors linked to the revolutionary left and the reincorporation of pro-fascist professors who had been sanitised during the revolutionary process opened the way for a reconfiguration of the way the dictatorship was taught and, above all, a rehabilitation of its memory and legacy. In the media space, various intellectuals from the far right of the pre- and post-25 April period also began to gain prominence as opinion makers and, from this privileged place of speech, they gradually managed to start whitewashing and legitimising Salazarism, moulding public opinion towards the recognition of social peace and the absence of crime and corruption that allegedly characterised the Estado Novo.
It will also be in the media sphere that – at least until the appearance of Chega and its efforts to occupy and mobilise the streets – this struggle to define how the country collectively remembers the dictatorial past will take place. In this sense, the representation of the collective memory practices concerning the far-right in Portugal will be addressed through a collection of news articles and opinion articles in Portuguese newspapers, mainly Expresso and Público, from the years of 2001 to 2023. This is due to the fact that it is more common to have demonstrations of far-right memory in the news media than in public societal manifestations in our country.
1) The presence of far-right movements in the collective memory debates today
As stated in the introduction to this report, far-right movements do not emerge in debates about Portuguese collective memory. In fact, unlike the Spanish Falange – useful to Franco during the Civil War – the Black Shirts in Italy, the Brown Shirts in Germany, the Ustasha in Croatia or the Iron Guard in Romania, Salazarism never relied on a paramilitary movement. On the contrary, despite initially giving space to movements such as Lusitanian Integralism or the Nun’Álvares Crusade – as long as they didn’t seek to mobilise or radicalise the streets – it was ruthless in persecuting and dismantling the national- syndicalist movement led by Rolão Preto – the blue shirts – and gave them the choice of integrating into the regime and dismantling the movement or persecution, imprisonment or exile (Pinto, 1994). Moreover, Salazar would always use his power to try to neutralise the Germanophile and neo-fascist faction and the Anglophile and reformist faction by means of a balance of power, never giving way to the emergence of a structured and influential movement to the right of the Estado Novo’s political-ideological orientation (Marchi, ; Marchi,).
In this sense, it will be the far-right camp in the post-25 April period – which in its reorganisation and adaptation to the new political reality will bring together, not without deep dissent and battles, the Salazarists, the Marcelists, the military far-right and the neo- fascist cadres of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s – that will be in charge of evoking the example and legacy of the heroes and intellectuals, above all, of Integralism and the neo-fascist movements of the post-Second World War. In publications such as A Rua, Resistência, Jornal Português de Economia & Finanças and O Diabo, among others of lesser expression or duration, they dedicated themselves to celebrating or rehabilitating the tutelary and modelling figures of Portuguese right-wing extremism. These publications, however, had a dissemination and readership limited to the most radicalised individuals on the right (whether they were militants of ‘democratic’ right-wing parties or the parties or movements of the post-fascist right). Moreover, some of these publications – most notably A Rua, the main Portuguese far-right weekly between 1976 and 1981 – depended on funding from political, economic and social agents who were interested in the return of the right to power and who recognised in the dynamism of the post-fascist right an alternative with the potential to overcome the strength that the communists and socialists had in the trade union movement and in the Assembly of the Republic, respectively (Madeira, 2020; Marchi, ).
The victory of the Democratic Alliance in the legislative elections and the winning of an absolute majority by this bloc of ‘democratic’ right-wingers meant that funding for the newspapers, parties and movements of the far right dried up abruptly, condemning the publications and publishing houses of this political camp to bankruptcy and closure. The inability of the editorial initiative of the post-fascist right to survive the cut in funding reveals, in our opinion, the small number of subscribers and buyers of the newspapers, magazines and books that were published, above all, between 1976 and 1981 (Madeira, 2020). Therefore, despite the immense editorial and propaganda effort, the far right failed to introduce any fractures or points of debate in the way the country’s collective memory remembered the Estado Novo and those who, in the present, celebrated it and wanted to reinstate a fascist regime.
Later, when the more intellectualised cadres turned to metapolitical intervention, it was the magazine Futuro Presente, above all, that evoked, celebrated and rehabilitated the cadres and intellectuals of Italian integralism, fascism and neo-fascism. This magazine, inspired by the ideals and political intervention strategies of Alain de Benoist’s nouvelle droite, was aimed at a narrow right-wing intellectual elite and an academic milieu that was beginning to be reoccupied by right-wing academics who had been sanitised in the revolutionary context or who had recently graduated. In this way, we can’t consider that Futuro Presente – and the nucleus of radical right-wing cadres that gathered around it – succeeded in immediately bringing out their talking points on the country’s history and recent memory. Nor was this the aim of the new Portuguese right. The metapolitical intervention was essentially aimed at a long and protracted work of eroding collective memory and the way in which Salazar, the Estado Novo and the far right were portrayed and taught, respectively, in the media sphere and in the various levels of education (from primary to higher education). In this sense, the election of Salazar as the greatest Portuguese ever in a contest promoted by Portuguese public television in 2007 and the rehabilitation of the dictator that followed that television programme can be interpreted as representing the success of the strategy devised by Jaime Nogueira Pinto – the figurehead of the far right in the post-25 April period and representative of Salazar’s candidacy in that programme – in 1980-1981.
In any case, in Portugal – unlike other countries that lived under Nazi-fascist regimes – there is no public expression of celebration, glorification or evocation of the extreme right-wing movements of the first three quarters of the 20th century. What’s more, the few attempts that have been made to do so have mobilised very few people and have had little or no media coverage, having little or no influence on the collective memory of the dictatorial past.
2) The resistance against far-right movements in the past and their memory today
Despite the emergence and rapid, exponential growth of the post-fascist right as of 2019, the strongest memory of the Estado Novo remains that of the resistance to fascism led, first and foremost, by the Portuguese Communist Party, whose role and selflessness in the fight against fascism is recognised by all the country’s political, social and intellectual players. Despite the anti-communism that has never ceased to deeply mark Portuguese society – especially in the north of the country, where the influence of the Catholic Church, political caciquism and social conservatism is greater – and the permanent attempt, since the Revolution, of isolating the PCP politically and presenting it as a force opposed to the liberal democracy that was established in Portugal – of which the Party was one of the main authors in the Constituent Assembly, still claiming to be one of the greatest defenders of the Constitution and, consequently, of the political regime approved on 2 April 1976 – the truth is that no one dares to dispute the centrality of the Communists in the anti-fascist resistance.
Faced with a collective memory and a public and official history that continues to portray Salazarism negatively and celebrate resistance, the right-wing and the most reactionary sectors of the Portuguese right tend to choose as a battle for memory the equation between 25 April 1974 and 25 November 1975, the day on which a counter-coup that united all the forces – political, civilian and military – that were neither communist nor of the radical and revolutionary left, definitively put an end to the social course of the revolution, civil and military – neither communist nor of the radical and revolutionary left, definitively put an end to the socialist course that the revolution had acquired, above all, since 11 March 1975 following a failed coup attempt by the extreme right led by former President of the Republic António de Spínola. 25 November was also the corollary of a spring and summer of bombings, attacks on the headquarters of the PCP, CGTP unions, residents’ committees and other organs of popular power and other parties of the radical and revolutionary left promoted by the post-fascist far right with the fundamental support of the high hierarchy of the Portuguese Catholic Church, especially in Braga, and with the connivance or at least the immobility of the ‘democratic’ right (Carvalho, ).
In this sense, celebrating 25 November 1975 or giving it the same historical importance as 25 April 1974 fulfils the purpose of combating the recognition of the role played by communists in resisting the Estado Novo, accusing them of having tried to implement a new dictatorial regime in the wake of the Revolution. Moreover, Portugal is currently engaged – civically and academically – in the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution, and not even Chega’s official communication seems interested in disputing its importance and deep political significance. The case changes substantially if we monitor and analyse the participation of the party’s militants and sympathisers on the social networks. There, especially on Facebook, the criticism and demonisation of the revolutionaries and the democratic regime that emerged from the revolution and the torrent of praise for Salazar, his example and his legacy are constant. This apparent contradiction between the message promoted by the party structure and that disseminated by its grassroots cadres or supporters is nothingmore than that. Chega, although it has incorporated the most radical elements of the two traditional parties of the Portuguese ‘democratic’ right and founders of its liberal democracy, has its roots in Salazarism, in the fight against democracy and party plurality and in the fight to return the extreme right to power and Portugal to Africa. Despite this, and unlike other countries mentioned above, the awareness that, apart from the radicalised fringes, the Portuguese electorate neither condemns the Revolution nor remembers the Estado Novo with nostalgia means that, for strategic and electoral reasons, the party has to moderate its official discourse and propaganda.
Moreover, museum structures such as the Aljube Museum – Resistance and Freedom and the National Resistance and Freedom Museum, both housed in former Estado Novo political prisons in Lisbon and Peniche, respectively, and the desire to set up a resistance museum in the former PIDE prison in the city of Porto (https://www.publico.pt/2023/04/22/local/noticia/porto-volta-debater-criacao-museu-resistencia-2047008) attest to a broad unity and common commitment to perpetuating the collective memory of the crimes of the Estado Novo. On the other hand, the prominence and rejuvenation of associations such as the Union of Anti-Fascist Resisters, the Civic Movement Don’t Erase the Memory, the Democratic Women’s Movement, the Alternative and Response Women’s Union, the 25 de Abril Association and the Conquistas da Revolução Association, all of which have different political and ideological sensitivities but are not irremediably distant and do extremely important work with Portuguese children and young people to preserve the memory of the resistance to fascism and the crimes of the Estado Novo, attests to the vitality and future potential of anti-fascist memory.
Finally, the mobilisation and involvement of the country’s primary and secondary schools, higher education institutions and research centres in the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution is also indicative of the importance that educational agents continue to attach to the evocation, dissemination and construction of the collective memory of the fascist past.
Case studies
The representation of the collective memory practices concerning the far-right in Portugal will be addressed through a collection of news articles and opinion articles in Portuguese newspapers Expresso and Público, from the years of 2001 to 2023. This is due to the fact that it is more common to have demonstrations of far-right memory in the news media than in public societal manifestations in our country.
“How are actions of certain oppressed groups (eg. Roma, Jewish, women) discussed (if at all)?”
When it comes to refugees and the crisis that struck Europe in 2015, the news media covered the criticism addressed to some national governments of Europe, for restoring border controls, and the EU, for the incapacity to respond effectively to the people in need (Siza, 2015). The leftist political parties in Portugal – who have been critical of the EU – claimed that the EU’s first response has been to close borders instead of opening humanitarian corridors to distribute, protect and support the refugees seeking help. This shows, for the Portuguese Communist Party, that the humanitarian response promoted by the European Union is nothing but a facade (Público/Lusa, 2015). The Portuguese Council for Refugees (PCR) also criticised the EU, stating that they had much higher capacity to welcome refugees than they did; and also the Portuguese government, for not giving them more financial support to allow them to have more resources to reach asylum seekers and refugees across the country (Lusa, 2019).
In recent years, Portugal has gone with the European flow of far-right political parties entering and taking on the political scene in the Parliament and in the news media. Despite the similarities and the connections with other European far-right parties such as the Spanish Vox, the Portuguese far-right party Chega does not identify with being far- right, as they claim to defend democracy (Botelho, 2019). However, it is responsible for portraying several minority groups unfavourably.
For instance, Chega defends refugees should not be able to get Portuguese nationality nor residence, and should stick to getting authorisations on the title of refugee, solely while their origin country is at war (Crisóstomo e Ferreira, 2019). As well as Portugal should not have open borders to welcome immigrants, because that would mean we are saying to them: ‘Come in anyway, do whatever you want, we’re all stupid and we’re here to welcome you’ (Botelho, 2019).
The typical characteristics of a populist party apply to Chega, with a constant making of promises of fast solutions to old problems and creating an opposition of “us” (the good Portuguese) and “them” (the ‘criminals’, ‘bandits’, ‘people who don’t want to work and live off of state subsidies’). This latter is usually pointed out to the Roma community, as André Ventura, president of Chega, believes that there is a problem inside of this community of resistance to the rules, stating “We don’t want to treat them badly, we don’t want to deprive them to access to essential state goods, we want them to understand that the Roma community (…) has to internalise the rule of law” (Botelho, 2019). The president of Chega claims that the working Portuguese are paying subsidies to a “majority that prefers to do nothing” (Botelho, 2019).
These ideas sum the party’s strategy to take on people’s general discontent and distrust with the political institutions and make them see Chega as an opportunity for a ‘miraculous’ solution to problems that cannot be easily solved by any political party (Borges, 2019). When it comes to the way people perceived Chega’s presence in the Parliament, there are difference in opinions. While some consider it’s a concern that Chega’s ideology and populist proposals manage to enter the house of democracy, others go on to criticise “the moral panic that has arisen over André Ventura’s arrival in Parliament (…) as if it were the end of democracy. In a democracy that has coexisted for decades with the extreme left, without much shame” (Cerqueira, 2019).
As there has now been a portrait of the party Chega and the role it occupies in the Portuguese political scene, there are two particular cases that are worth mentioning.
(1) The case of the Coxi family: A family from Bairro da Jamaica2 – who was photographed alongside the President of the Portuguese Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa – received comments from the leader for the far-right party Chega, André Ventura, referring to them as “bandits”. During the electoral campaign of 2021, he declared that the President “joined criminals”, adding that he personally “would never be the President of drug traffickers or pedophiles”, which does not correspond to his idea of being a president of the “good Portuguese” (Franco and Gomes, 2021). After André Ventura was ordered to apologise, he showed no remorse and said he would do the same again (Oliveira, 2021).
(2) An episode of women solidarity struck in the 2021 presidential elections when the leader of the far-right party Chega, André Ventura, made sexist comments about Marisa Matias, eurodeputy of a leftist party, claiming she had “very red lips”(Oliveira, 2021; Esperança, 2021). André Ventura’s attempt to minimize women to their appearance received a lot of backlash (Esperança, 2021). In less than 24 hours, women and men gathered online to make posts using the hashtag #vermelhoembelem and publicly stating “they shall not pass”. This became one of the symbols of the electoral campaign against the far-right. Also, it contributed to maintaining the symbolic aspect of the red lipstick that is associated with women’s revolution and emancipation, in historical terms (Polacow, 2021; Esperança, 2021).
Is there an employment of this past history by newer right-wing, far-right political actors and how?
The case of Alcindo Monteiro is a mark in the history of racist violence in Portugal. Brutally murdered by skinheads in 1995, due to the colour of his skin.
The far-right movement has had as main figures Mário Machado, who was presented in a daytime television programme and introduced as “an author of controversial statements” in 2019. Instead, an opinion article states he should have been introduced as a “the black beater who defends Nazism’ (Soeiro, 2019). There was a media wash of the person of Mário Machado, who was not introduced as a nazi skinhead who has been condemned to over 4 years of prison for involvement in the murder of Alcindo (Lusa, 2022). He also filed a complaint for defamation and slander against Mamadou Ba, anti-racist activist for calling him the murderer of Alcindo (Lusa, 2022).
In 2020, other skinheads who were condemned for the death of Alcindo were accused again of other racist and homophobic crimes in Lisbon . The Portugal Skinheads takes on Nazi ideology, promoting and glorifying white supremacy, with the intention of excluding or prohibiting all ethnic minorities from entering Portugal, while also targeting black and Roma people (Gustavo, 2020). It has also been pointed out that some of the members are joining the far-right political party Chega, which they understand as a wider platform where they can discreetly disseminate racial hatred and amplify their message (Gomes, Franco and Gustavo, 2021). This can be pointed out as a result of the invite of Mário Machado for his followers/members to join Chega (Paulo e Coelho, 2020; Franco, Coelho e Carrapatoso, 2020).
A tribute was made to Alcindo Monteiro by the Anti-Racist Front, along with other victims of racially motivated crimes. At the same time, a manifestation of a far-right party Ergue-te is held to celebrate the “Day of Race and Nationalities” (Gustavo and Franco, 2023).
How is this occurring: museums, memorials, monuments?
There has been an ongoing debate around the possibility of creating a museum focused on the Portuguese dictator, António de Oliveira Salazar, in Santa Comba Dão, that stem from the municipality. This has provoked a divisive moment with opposing views in Portuguese society, who are concerned about the approach this museum would take: would it be reminiscent of the historical past and its events or would it be truthful to the harsh dictatorship our society lived in?
In 2007, a meeting of the Union of Portuguese Anti-Fascist Resistance that would result in a protest against the creation of this museum encountered some people who were counter-protesting and defending the Portuguese dictator, by either praising him and his work and also by showing pamphlets and posters of support. The coordinator of the Union of Portuguese Anti-Fascist Resistance, Aurélio Santos, emphasises that “any museum dedicated to the New State must not be approached from the perspective of the oppressors, but from the viewpoint of those who fought for freedom”, otherwise it would “face the risk of being transformed into a sanctuary of the dictator” (N/N, 2007).
Following this line of thought, historians have voiced their opinions and concerns about this hypothetical yet controversial museum, worried that it would become a haven for the dictator, where fascist sympathisers would feel welcomed and validated (Franco, 2019). Instead, the historian Irene Pimentel tends to believe that Portugal could benefit from a museum that would deepen the history of the regime, showcasing its reality through a portrait of the Portuguese society, the “illiberal, anti-communist and corporatist ideology of Salazar”, the colonial empire, the social, health and education policies and its repressive and censorship institutions. Further adding that democracy is the only political regime that allows freedom and pluralism of ideas, but does not celebrate dictators (Pimentel, 2019).
On the opposite side of the debate would stand a curious argument, of comparison of the situation with other countries. It has been acknowledged that other countries have museums dedicated to their dictators, such as, for instance, Mussolini in Italy. A question is posed by political scientist Jaime Nogueira Pinto: “If other countries and societies have experienced much more extreme and violent histories than ours, why do certain anti- fascist individuals in our country (…) express such strong opposition to the proposal of establishing a historical center dedicated to Salazar and the New State?” (Pinto, 2019). Additionally, he claims the Portuguese left seems to be scared of the “popular pilgrimage”, completely cutting off the idea of the museum and censuring the past of the country (Pinto, 2019).
News also accounted for testimonies of citizens from Santa Comba Dão and members of a small nationalist movement – that has disaggregated in the meantime – who admired the dictator and believed that the historical memory of Salazar should be preserved. This period also brought attention to some pro-Salazar manifestations that would happen to celebrate the anniversary of the dictator in his cemetery grave (Albuquerque, 2007a; Albuquerque, 2007b).
In 2019, there was a petition against the creation of the museum, which reached 18 000 signatures and was handed to the Prime-Minister (Soares, 2019). In political terms, there has been a common agitation against this museum that spread all across the vast political spectrum of the country.
Earlier this year, the municipality of Santa Comba Dão announced that the project would be ready in the month of May, despite all the controversy and the condemnation on behalf of the Parliament, who voted against the creation of this museum in 2019 (Coutinho, 2023). However, there has not been any news about the museum since then. Another manifestation of the way historical far-right figures are perceived in Portugal can be addressed by the contest that would indicate “The Great Portuguese” in 2007, which had Salazar as the chosen figure of the country. This was considered a sign of “lack of identification with democracy” and a representation of the “authoritarian, repressive, retrograde, sexist, closed, poor, colonialist and warlike society” that represents his time and the mark it has left until today. The fragility of democracy is demonstrated by the commendation on Salazar as the greatest Portuguese, where people ignore the decades of dictatorship with no right for political opposition, the torture, censorship and political discrimination, no right to think and act freely. Instead, the Portuguese people chose the responsible person for that to be considered the greatest (Malheiros, 2007; Ramos, 2007). This resulted in a division of the society, with some people feeling angry about the choice, while others try to not give it too much attention and others are amused about Salazar’s name being elected.
Notes
2 Bairro da Jamaica emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s through individual occupations of private property. In2017, there was a survey about the number of people living in the neighbourhood and around 750 people were identified and entitled to be included in a rehousing process (Lusa, 2023).
Bibliography
Albuquerque, M. (2007a, 28th April). Autoridades policiais atentas à concentração pró- salazarista em Santa Comba Dão. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2007/04/28/politica/noticia/autoridades-policiais-atentas-a-concentracao-prosalazarista-em-santa-comba-dao-1292428 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Albuquerque, M. (2007b, 29th April). Pró-salazaristas querem museu com o bom e o mau do regime. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2007/04/29/jornal/prosalazaristas-querem-museu-com-o-bom-e-o-mau-do-regime-212804 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Borges, L. (2019, 8th October). Entrada de extrema-direita no Parlamento “deve alarmar partidos”. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/08/politica/noticia/entrada-extremadireita-parlamento-alarmar-partidos-1889207 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Botelho, L. (2019, 28th October). “Não vai haver extremo nenhum em Portugal graças ao Chega”. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/28/politica/entrevista/andre-ventura-chega-entrevista-1891355 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Cerqueira, J. J. (2019, 11th October). A preocupação com André Ventura. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/11/politica/opiniao/preocupacao-andre- ventura-1889582 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Coutinho, M. (2023, 6th March). “Museu Salazar”: Parlamento condenou, ministro da Cultura desconhece, mas Santa Comba Dão arranca com projeto em maio. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/politica/2023-03-06-Museu-Salazar-Parlamento-condenou-ministro-da-Cultura-desconhece-mas-Santa-Comba-Dao-arranca-com-projeto-em-maio-f9e439af (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Crisóstomo, P. (2019, 7th October). Iniciativa Liberal, Livre e Chega estreiam-se com eleição em Lisboa. Público. Available in: https://www.publico.pt/2019/10/07/politica/noticia/iniciativa-liberal-livre-chega-estreiamse-parlamento-eleicao-lisboa-1889095 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Esperança, B. (2021, 18th January) Vermelho não é só uma questão estética. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2021/01/18/p3/noticia/vermelho-nao-so-questao-estetica-1946796 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Franco, H. (2019, 27th July). Salazar regressa a Santa Comba. Expresso. Available at: https://leitor.expresso.pt/semanario/semanario2439/html/primeiro-caderno/sociedade/salazar-regressa-a-santa-comba (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Franco, H., Coelho, L. & Carrapatoso, M. (2020, 13th September). Autoridades seguem mais de uma dezena de extremistas do Chega. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/politica/2020-09-13-Autoridades-seguem-mais-de-uma-dezena-de-extremistas-do-Chega (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Franco, H. & Gomes, H. (2021, 25th May). Tribunal diz que declarações de André Ventura “são falsas”, “especialmente graves” e “marginalizam” os ofendidos. Expresso. Available at: https://amp.expresso.pt/sociedade/2021-05-25-Tribunal-diz-que-declaracoes-de-Andre-Ventura-sao-falsas-especialmente-graves-e-marginalizam-os-ofendidos-790f4112 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Gomes, H. (2021, 25th May). “Humilhar negros e pobres não é arma retórica à disposição de políticos”, diz advogada da família a que Ventura chamou “bandidos”. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/politica/2021-05-25-Humilhar-negros-e-pobres-nao-e-arma-retorica-a-disposicao-de-politicos-diz-advogada-da-familia-a-que-Ventura-chamou-bandidos-74dbf81b (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Gomes, H., Franco, H. & Gustavo, R. (2021, 5th August). Neonazis infiltram-se no Chega. Partido desconhece. Expresso. Available at: https://amp.expresso.pt/politica/2021-08-05-Neonazis-infiltram-se-no-Chega.-Partido-desconhece-f845d26a (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Gustavo, R. (2020, 14th June). Quem são os condenados no caso Alcindo Monteiro que voltam a ser acusados de crimes de ódio. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2020-06-14-Quem-sao-os-condenados-no-caso-Alcindo-Monteiro-que-voltam-a-ser-acusados-de-crimes-de-odio (consulted on 25th September2023).
Gustavo, R. & Franco, h. (2023, 9th June). No “dia da raça” do Ergue-te e de uma concentração nacionalista, Alcindo Monteiro e outras vítimas de racismo são homenageadas em Lisboa. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2023-06-09-No-dia-da-raca-do-Ergue-te-e-de-uma-concentracao-nacionalista-Alcindo-Monteiro-e-outras-vitimas-de-racismo-sao-homenageadas-em-Lisboa-023833ad (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Lopes, M. A./LUSA (2022, 26th October). MP pede ida a julgamento de Mamadou Ba por difamação do ex-líder dos Hammerskins, Mário Machado. Expresso. Available at:
https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2022-10-26-MP-pede-ida-a-julgamento-de-Mamadou-Ba-por-difamacao-do-ex-lider-dos-Hammerskins-Mario-Machado-def6ec3e (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Lusa (2019, 19th June). Portugal pode fazer “trabalho exemplar” no acolhimento de refugiados. Expresso. Available at: https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2019-06-19-Portugal-pode-fazer-trabalho-exemplar-no-acolhimento-de-refugiados (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Lusa (2022, 19th March). SOS Racismo repudia decisão de tribunal a pedido de Mário Machado. Expresso. Available at: https://amp.expresso.pt/sociedade/2022-03-19-SOS-Racismo-repudia-decisao-de-tribunal-a-pedido-de-Mario-Machado-92fd11b6 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Lusa (2023, 25th January). Realojamento no bairro da Jamaica é a chave para a mudança há muito esperada. Available at: https://observador.pt/2023/01/25/realojamento-no-bairro-da-jamaica-e-a-chave-para-a-mudanca-ha-muito-esperada/ (consulted on 26th September 2023).
Malheiros, J. V. (2007, 27th March). A única eleição que Salazar ganhou. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2007/03/27/jornal/a-unica-eleicao-que-salazar-ganhou-181639 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Paulo, I. & Coelho, L. (2020, 7th February). Chega não vai denunciar simpatizante que fez a saudação nazi no Porto. Expresso. Available at:
https://expresso.pt/dossies/diario/2020-02-07-Chega-nao-vai-denunciar-simpatizante-que-fez-a-saudacao-nazi-no-Porto (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Pimentel, I. F. (2019, 24th August). Faz sentido um Museu Salazar em Santa Comba Dão? Expresso. Available at: https://leitor.expresso.pt/semanario/semanario2443/html/primeiro-caderno/a-abrir/duelo/faz-sentido-um-museu-salazar-em-santa-comba-dao- (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Pinto, J. N. (2019, 24th August). Faz sentido um Museu Salazar em Santa Comba Dão? Expresso. Available at: https://leitor.expresso.pt/semanario/semanario2443/html/primeiro-caderno/a-abrir/duelo/faz-sentido-um-museu-salazar-em-santa-comba-dao- (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Pocalow, F. (2021, 19th January). #VermelhoEmBelém e #EleNão: o que podemos aprender com o Brasil. Público. Available at:
https://www.publico.pt/2021/01/19/opiniao/noticia/vermelhoembelem-elenao-podemos-aprender-brasil-1946898 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Público/Lusa (2015, 15th September). Casos de suspensão de Schengen indignam PCP e BE. Público.
Oliveira, O. L. (2021, 22nd January). Uma campanha reanimada pelo inimigo. Expresso. Available at: https://leitor.expresso.pt/semanario/semanario2517/html/primeiro-caderno/politica/uma-campanha-reanimada-pelo-inimigo (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Ramos, R. (2007, 28th March). Por quem os telefones tocam. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2007/03/28/jornal/por-quem-os-telefones-tocam-181753 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
N/N. (2007, 4th March). Museu Salazar GNR evita confrontos em Santa Comba Dão.
Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/2007/03/04/jornal/museu-salazar-gnr-evita-confrontos-em-santa-comba-dao-178698 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Siza, R. (2015, 14th September). Ministros da UE adiam decisão sobre redistribuição de refugiados. Público. Available at:
https://www.publico.pt/2015/09/14/mundo/noticia/ministros-adiam-decisao-sobre-quotas-para-a-redistribuicao-de-refugiados-1707813 (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Soares, M. G. (2019, 28th August). Petição contra museu de Salazar foi encerrada. Promotores aguardam resposta de Costa. Expresso. Available at:
https://expresso.pt/sociedade/2019-08-28-Peticao-contra-museu-de-Salazar-foi-encerrada.-Promotores-aguardam-resposta-de-Costa (consulted on 25th September 2023).
Soeiro, J. (2019, 4th January) Obrigado, Goucha. Obrigado, TVI. Expresso. Available at: https://amp.expresso.pt/blogues/jose-soeiro/2019-01-04-Obrigado-Goucha.-Obrigado-TVI (consulted on 25th September 2023).