Report on heritage practices concerning far-right movements
- Introduction
Historically, memory has been an important political resource for various far-right groups both in and outside Europe because of its perceived value as a source of motivation for political action1. As suggested by a growing body of academic work, this is still the case today: far-right political actors in Europe are increasingly driven by discursive repertoires and public tropes through which they mobilise efforts to mythologise the past in the service of needs and conceptions of their respective memory politics2. More importantly, they rely on such practices in order to construe themselves as the true heirs and bearers of national heritage and identity. This can be conceived as narrowly as through the lens of physical (or sometimes conceptual) sites associated with a particular, and often selective, interpretation of collective memory, such as monuments, religious shrines, ruins, museums, buildings, amongst other locations, where memory at once crystallises or has occurred at a particular historical moment3. In Finland, the memory of the historical and contemporary far-right is no exception to that of its European counterparts, being deeply tied to certain memory and commemoration practices – including physical sites of memory – across the country. In this report, I will briefly introduce three cases of such practices and sites of memory and discuss how they are both unique but also strikingly similar to other memory practices amongst members of the broader historical and contemporary European far-right.
The far-right’s efforts to instrumentalise the past can be made sense of within the context of “memory entrepreneurship”, which describes how the ownership of contested memories is claimed by a certain group, also called “memory entrepreneurs”, in an attempt to gain popular support for their cause. By doing so, they “seek social recognition and political legitimacy of one (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past” whilst remaining “engaged and concerned with maintaining and promoting active and visible social and political attention on their enterprise”4. The perceived legitimacy of this enterprise then rests on the earlier observation that such groups claim to construe themselves as the true heirs and bearers of national heritage and identity, which is often further contrasted in far-right populist commentary by introducing an opposing force – such as political elites or immigrants – that is working against their common interests5. To be sure, it is the polarising act of pitting “us” against “them” that drives far-right memory politics, the idea that the past should not only not be forgotten but also remembered in a way particular to their narrow conception of national identity. By holding onto this singularity of memory and national membership, far-right memory entrepreneurs identify themselves through certain historical figures, such as heroes and martyrs, who are believed to exhibit true national character6.
Much like elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, far-right politics have also developed a strong online presence7, where memory practices such as those described above are not only discussed but also maintained. Due to the increased online activity of far-right activists in Finland, however, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service has expressed concern over their increasing radicalisation and its implications for national security, noting that “[l]one operators and small groups constitute the most significant danger to national security […] a growing threat of extreme right-wing terrorism”8. In 2018, following the Supreme Court’s rule to uphold a ban on the neo-Nazi group Nordic Resistance Movement, it was precisely the writings on the organisation’s website that were cited as [having] targeted various population groups in a way that has to be considered ethnic agitation and therefore criminal. In addition, the use of violence linked to the organisation’s activities has to be considered a part of the organisation’s operations.9
Since this report has been produced by the Peace Education Institute in Finland, what is of particular interest to our work as peace educators – and also extremely relevant in the context of this report – is the notion of a “duty of memory”10, or a duty to remember, which is also mentioned in UNESCO’s Recommendation on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Sustainable Development11. Indeed, memory cultures are primarily concerned with such social obligations, revolving around the fundamental question of what should be remembered about the past, or rather, what should not be forgotten12. As will be shown in the coming pages, far-right groups and organisations are no stranger to this line of thought because their very memory culture draws upon the recognition of such social obligations, which play an important role in how far-right views are disseminated and, to varying degrees of success, popularised in Finnish society through the following three cases of memory and commemorative practices. Yet when it comes to the duty of memory, it is perhaps our duty as peace educators to combat this singularity of memory and seek avenues for deepening our understanding of the past not as something that people ought to remember in and of itself, but rather as a way to acknowledge and bring awareness to its presence in contemporary politics.
Before proceeding to the next section, I should like to inform the reader that parts of this report have been based on the interviews of two leading scholars in the field of far-right studies in Finland, Dr Oula Silvennoinen (University of Helsinki) and Dr Tommi Kotonen (University of Jyväskylä). These interviews, considered expert interviews, were conducted on February 12, 2024, and on February 20, 2024, respectively, by the author of this report. In social science research, the advantages of expert interviews can be described as follows: not only do they provide context-specific information that can facilitate the interpretation of secondary sources, but they also help address the “bigger picture” that may go unnoticed during the analysis phase. In other words, expert interviews can provide the data to link the macro and micro levels of analysis.13 For purposes specific to this report, however, the interviews were also conducted to collect additional data about the subject matter, which can then be used to address other relevant issues in our history education system about the historical and contemporary far-right in Finland, as well as further advance peace and global education at large.
2. Far-Right Memory and Commemorative Practices
In this chapter, I will examine three cases of far-right memory and commemorative practices, which are divided into civil war memorials, graves of prominent historical figures and – to offer a more recent example of memory politics in Finland – the memorial to the victims of the 2017 attack. Each of these practices will be provided with a brief historical background for those unfamiliar with Finnish contemporary history, as well as an analysis part consisting of comparisons between past and present practices of remembrance, which are then used to highlight continuities and discontinuities in far-right memory culture. In addition, each of these cases will be, whenever possible, contrasted with examples of public efforts and civil society initiatives to challenge their prevailing notions of the past in order to facilitate our understanding of the plurality of memory. This is because far-right memory politics, despite having long-established roots in Finnish society and therefore being both a historical and contemporary phenomenon, has become an increasingly significant concern for educators, teachers, scholars and peace activists today.
2.1 White Finland and Civil War Memorials
It was only the victory of the White Army that gave birth to the democratic and independent Finland in which we have had a chance to live for 90 years; the victory of the Reds, in light of everything we have learned later, would have deemed Finland part of the Soviet Union.14
Our goal was simple: we wanted to bring the dark side of Mannerheim into the cultural discussion, the image of a butcher surrounded by – yet situated a safe distance away from – the sea of flames in Tampere, to whom victory was to be achieved by any means necessary.15
The above quotes by the Finnish historian Eskola Seikko and director Katariina Lillqvist, who produced an animated short film based on the above description, in 2008 encapsulate the contested memory of the Civil War in Finland. Even more than ten years later, at the time of writing this report, the legacy of the Civil War remains one of the most divisive issues in Finnish contemporary history. Although a great deal of scholarly attention has focused on different aspects of the war and thus greatly enriched our understanding of its history, the last vestiges of the shadow cast by the war can still be experienced in 21st-century discussions about how it should be remembered, which was strongly felt during the centennial coin scandal in 201816. Moreover, this is particularly true for far-right groups such as Suomen Sisu, which has attempted to revive the tradition to commemorate the beginning of the Civil War, alternatively known as the “war of liberation”17– amongst other occasions – every last Sunday of January18.
Before discussing the significance of the Civil War for right-wing radicals and extremists, a brief historical background would be appropriate19. From January to May 1918, Finland was caught up in a bloody civil war between the Reds, led by a section of the Social Democratic Party, and the Whites, led by the Senate and those who opposed the former’s socialism, or the idea of Red Finland. Following the success of the White Army and its German allies, which had invaded Helsinki at the height of the First World War despite the opposition by the White leadership, the war resulted in the Reds’ defeat after three months of fighting, thereby cementing the notion of White Finland as the dominant discourse of collective memory in the interwar period. Despite its shortness, the war, in a newly founded republic, which had only declared independence from the Russian Empire less than half a year earlier, had a lasting impact on the following decades. In practice, although political violence had been prevalent on both sides during the war, the defeated Reds were collectively punished for taking part in a rebellion against the Finnish government – in an act acknowledged as White terror only until a much later date – which was reinforced through unlawful means and incorporated into public life as well as historical records of the events of 1918.20
According to historian Seppo Hentilä, Finland became an authoritarian White society as a result of the war, which remained so throughout the interwar period21. Whilst some parties advocating authoritarian politics merely operated under the guise of traditional nationalism, openly far-right groups, whilst small in numbers, also began to emerge22. However, precisely because they were small in numbers, they never dominated Finnish politics; nevertheless, their influence as first proponents of far-right ideology in Finland was still significant. Yet when faced with the prospect of another world war in the late 1930s, the nation was forced to seek ways to reunify against a common enemy, which saw the emergence of what became famously known as the “spirit of the Winter War”, the idea of Finnish national unity needed to withstand the threat of Soviet invasion. Regardless, it was not until the 1980s that the issue of the Civil War ceased to be a national trauma and was later acknowledged as a historical event deemed worthy of critical analysis and thus increasing scholarly attention. Since the end of the Cold War, this trend has further developed to include the notion that in the 21st century there ought to be a shared memory of the Civil War that rises above the divisions of the past.23
Contrary to the ideal of a shared memory of the Civil War, far-right forces have persistently sought to maintain commemorative practices that reinforce the memory of White Finland, particularly that which existed in the 1930s. In the aftermath of the war, such groups – here encompassing both far-right and fascist alike – were disappointed by the political diversity of post-Civil War governments, which had a greater respect for the democratic constitution than preferred by Finnish nationalists24. In the broader Finnish society, however, far-right politics gained ground in a number of civic organisations and magazines, which played a significant role in propagating and cementing the memory of White Finland throughout the interwar period25. This can be seen in the form of Civil War memorials erected across the country that celebrated the White victory, including its associated heroes and martyrs, one of whom known as Bobi Sivén will be discussed in the next section. By 1939, approximately 300 official memorials celebrating the Whites were erected, as opposed to only 15 memorials for the Reds26.
Despite the White victory, right-wing radicalism in 1920s and 1930s Finland emerged as a reactionary response to the disappointment in the perceived moderacy of post-Civil War governments, which appeared to have abandoned their quest for White Finland. In this respect, Civil War memorials for the Whites honoured the legacy of White Finland that a great number of Finnish nationalists, particularly those on the far-right end of the political spectrum, regarded as their past as well as future. These memorials also effectively erased the memory of White terror altogether, presenting the White Army as the liberator from the socialist Reds, who were perceived as having committed acts of terror against the former. Yet instead of emphasising victimhood, such memorials focused on the heroism of the White Army, as well as their sacrifice for defending Finnish independence. For right-wing radicals, this particular focus on past heroism served, and as will be seen in the next section, continues to serve as a source of motivation for political action.
As observed by historian Oula Silvennoinen, the notion of White Finland is still central to far right memory culture today not only because of the 1930s alone, when the fascist Lapua Movement and its successor Patriotic People’s Movement were founded27, but also because in the 21st century their contemporary successors have sought to revive the memory of the Civil War by emphasising the legacy of White Finland. In fact, he argues that the Civil War, or the “war of liberation” as it is known to Finnish nationalists, is perhaps the single most important event in Finnish contemporary history to such groups and individuals because it radicalised them to the extent that its symbols are still in active use today. Therefore, any later attempts to overthrow the Finnish government – such as in the 1932 Mäntsälä Rebellion, which had the Lapua Movement banned – or to promote radical politics in Finland can be understood within the context of materialising the dream of White Finland, or that of Greater Finland28, and putting an end to the government’s moderate politics and commitment to constitutionality.
Based on the preceding discussion, it can be argued that there is a strong sense of “unfinished business” to far-right memory politics surrounding the memory of the Civil War. This was further aided by the shift in Finnish memory culture caused by the “spirit of the Winter War”, which saw far-right and fascist memory practices, such as commemorating the beginning of the Civil War every last Sunday of January, to be deemed obsolete – or inappropriate – by a vast majority of Finnish politicians towards the end of the Winter War29. Indeed, as Silvennoinen argues, the end of the Second World War brought about an important change in Finnish memory culture as a whole, which relegated the notion of White Finland to a position of lesser significance in favour of emphasising national unity. Yet the practice to commemorate the beginning of the Civil War, also known as tammisunnuntai in Finnish, has been revived by far-right and fascist groups of the 21st century, which shows that far-right memory culture is still deeply rooted in the memory of White Finland and its associated heroes and martyrs.
2.2 Grave Politics
In far-right memory culture, certain historical figures are honoured as heroes and martyrs because they are perceived to exhibit true national character30. This goes as far as their graves having become part of a ritualised memory practice, which are maintained as sites of public memory to assert consequence, hence the term “grave politics”31. In 21st-century Finland, the far-right commemoration of prominent historical figures has its roots in what was previously discussed as honouring the legacy of White Finland. Here, I will briefly introduce three such cases and discuss their significance to the contemporary far-right.
2.2.1 Bobi Sivén
Bobi Sivén, born Hans Håkon Christian Sivén in 1899, is widely regarded as one of the earliest martyrs to die for his political beliefs by the contemporary far-right. Hailing from a lineage of activists who adhered to the idea of Greater Finland, Sivén was a strong advocate of pan-Finnicism throughout his short life, which earned him a reputation amongst his right wing peers. Yet his death marked a significant turning point in the far-right memory culture of the 1920s; the nationalist Academic Karelia Society32 at the time even sewed the bullet that killed him into their flag after he shot himself in 1921 as a protest to the Treaty of Tartu in 1920, which right-wing radicals like him viewed as a humiliation due to the territories ceded to Soviet Russia. One hundred years later, Sivén’s grave is still annually visited by far-right activists to honour his death and sacrifice for the cause of Greater Finland.33 However, his grave at the time of his death was nowhere near the pilgrimage site that it is today: in fact, it became such a prominent site of far-right memory only in the 21st century, when members of present-day far-right groups such as Suomen Sisu began to religiously commemorate his historical figure. Now declared as a martyr by such groups, Sivén has since been hailed as an independence activist for pan-Finnicists, who took part in what were known as “tribal wars”, or heimosodat in Finnish, which describe a series of armed conflicts and private military expeditions in the late 1910s and early 1920s intended to assert control over areas inhabited by Finnic peoples, or to help them gain independence from Soviet Russia. Needless to say, his reputation as a renowned independence activist has only remained so within right-wing radicals and other Finnish nationalists.
2.2.2 Eugen Schauman
Eugen Schauman, born Eugen Waldemar Schauman in 1875, was a Finnish nationalist and nobleman most known for the assassination of General Governor Nikolay Bobrikov, a Russian general and politician, in 1904. Prior to his death, Bobrikov was responsible for the integration policies of the 1899–1904 period in the former Grand Duchy of Finland, which made him deeply unpopular in Finland, the subject of his Russification plans. Motivated by both personal and political reasons, this prompted Schauman to assassinate him, which earned him the reputation of a national hero overnight. Despite his initial fame, however, Schauman’s legacy has since remained greatly disputed: on the one hand, he was and is still occasionally hailed as a national hero for his resistance to Russian oppression. On the other hand, he was and is also increasingly viewed as a controversial figure for his crime despite the highly unpopular integration policies and measures taken by Bobrikov, which also explains the lack of consensus on the meaning of his legacy. As in the case of Sivén, the most prominent admirers of his historical figure can be expectedly found amongst far-right forces, which have been keen to claim his legacy as their own by visiting his grave in recent years34.
Like Sivén, Schauman shot himself after his assassination of Bobrikov, which sealed his later reputation as a martyr of Finnish independence. Although the moral and legal implications of his act were already debated in the 1920s and 1930s, the heroism associated with him has persisted to this day due to the continued efforts to commemorate him as a national hero. To be sure, martyrs only become martyrs because they are remembered and honoured as such, yet who is considered a martyr to one may be a traitor – or here perhaps a terrorist – to another35. In the case of Schauman, this has been the primary focus of 21st-century discussions regarding his life and ultimate decision to assassinate Bobrikov, including what plagued his private life36, yet the necessity of his act is still occasionally defended by certain conservative historians37, which also perpetuates the myth surrounding his heroism.
2.2.3 Lauri Törni
Born in 1919, Lauri Törni was a Finnish soldier known for having fought under three different flags: first as a Finnish Army officer in both the Winter War and the Continuation War; then as a Waffen-SS Captain on the Eastern Front in the Second World War; and later as a U.S. Army Major in the Vietnam War, which is also where he met his demise following a helicopter crash in 1965. Based on these facts alone, Törni poses a complex historical figure, which is further complicated by his conviction for treason in 1946 due to his Waffen-SS training towards the end of the Second World War. Yet right-wing radicals and extremists have turned to honour his memory not only because of his anti-communism, which he has been strongly associated with since the 1970s and 1980s, but also because he is perceived to exhibit true national character. However, it is worth noting that he achieved national fame only long after his death through the publication of several historical biographies that, to a great degree, fictionalised and romanticised his character38.
Despite having fought under three flags and being convicted of treason, the far-right commemoration of Törni is greatly inspired by romanticised notions of his heroism and chivalry: the legacies of White Finland and the Lapua Movement, patriotism, anti communism, Russophobia, martyrdom, amongst other things. Because he neither wrote nor spoke extensively about himself during his lifetime, later interpretations about him and his motivations to join the Waffen-SS, for instance, have attempted to fill these gaps – often to defend his image as a national hero as well as to belittle the relevance of evidence to the contrary39– thus perpetuating the myth of his patriotism. Whilst he has a gravestone at Arlington National Cemetery in the United States, which has his name spelt as Larry Alan Thorne, he also has a gravestone in Helsinki. Unlike Sivén’s and Schauman’s graves, however, his grave has not become quite the pilgrimage site that the two others are, although his memory has nevertheless been honoured as a fierce anti-communist and a national hero worth celebrating.
2.3 The Memorial to the Victims of the 2017 Attack
The memorial to the victims of the 2017 attack in Turku is a recent site of memory in the Finnish heritage landscape. Originally located in the city centre of Turku at the place of the attack until its moving to a nearby park, the memorial has a great deal of significance for different groups both locally and nationwide. Given the unprecedented violence of the 2017 attack, the memorial quickly became a topic of national politics between different activist groups and their commemorative practices, most notably the far-right event 188-Kukkavirta, which is organised annually by the National Alliance to commemorate the victims of the attack, and its counter-protest Turku without Nazis, which describes itself as a “politically unaffiliated coalition” engaging in an “antifascist and antiracist demonstration”. In practice, the memorial is more closely linked to the memory politics of the former. For such groups, it has become a commemorative practice encompassing all victims of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, including those that have taken place in Norway, France and Spain in 2011, 2015 and 2017, respectively. This, however, is disputed by the latter, which views the far-right commemoration of the victims merely as an attempt to propagate far-right politics involving unfounded claims about salient political issues such as immigration – namely through hate speech against ethnic minorities40– in Finnish society.
The events of the 2017 attack can be summarised as follows: on August 18, 2017, two women were killed and eight were injured in the city centre of Turku by a rejected asylum seeker from Morocco, who attacked them using two kitchen knives until he was shot by police and taken into custody after failing to comply with their commands. In June 2018, the man was later sentenced to life imprisonment for two murders and eight attempted murders, all of which the court described were motivated by terrorist intent41. The case sparked a national debate over immigration and security, which began in the immediate aftermath of the attack and has continued since. As a result, the far-right event 188-Kukkavirta to commemorate the victims of the attack has been organised annually since August 18, 2018, which at the time attracted approximately 3000 people, including members from various far-right groups, such as the Soldiers of Odin and the Nordic Resistance Movement (disbanded since 2020). The event was also controversially attended by some of the Finns Party, a right-wing populist party with a history of promoting ethnic Finnish nationalism42.
The far-right groups in Finland were amongst the first to associate the 2017 attack with international terrorism – even before the Supreme Court’s decision – and have since relied on the memory of other similar attacks as a cornerstone of their extremist politics. Meanwhile, anti-fascist activists have organised rallies to challenge the legitimacy of this enterprise, which is particularly seen at the far-right event 188-Kukkavirta, claiming that right-wing radicals are using the memory of the victims to propagate their own extremist politics. The same can be said about other such events where clashes between far-right and anti-fascist activists have continued to take place, such as the far-right independence march and its related marches43, which political scientist Tommi Kotonen describes as one of the most prominent attempts to claim a certain commemorative practice as their own by the contemporary far right. In Helsinki, as in Turku since 2017, public displays of far-right activism are often met with a response from the counter-protest Helsinki without Nazis, a coalition of anti-fascist activists consisting of several left-leaning groups. This shows that operations by far-right activists, whilst already monitored by the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service for security purposes, are increasingly followed by counter-reactions from different sections of Finnish civil society, which continue to challenge the prospect of growing right-wing radicalism in the liberal democracy.
Given the temporal proximity of the 2017 attack, the collective memory of the events has primarily revolved around the commemoration of its victims. The latest addition to this narrative is the 2022 documentary Broken Dreamland directed by Hannu-Pekka Vitikainen and Khalid Laboudi, which tells the story of two of the attacker’s close friends in Turku and how they struggle to belong in a world that rejects wherever they go. The synopsis of the documentary describes it as follows:
They were children when they left, dreaming of a life without worry: freedom and wealth. But what awaited them was a nightmare. One of them began to change, leading him to commit a lethal knife attack in Turku, Finland. By following the lives of two of the attacker’s friends, the film delves into the experiences of an entire generation of young Moroccan men who feel like they do not belong anywhere. While their families push them to travel to Europe to find a better life, Europe casts them out.44
3 Conclusions
This report has now described three cases of memory and commemorative practices related to the historical and contemporary far-right in Finland and attempted to highlight continuities and discontinuities between their respective memory cultures. By tracing the origin of far right memory politics to the event of White victory in 1918, which has since inspired Finnish nationalists to honour the memory of its associated heroes and martyrs, it can be well established that far-right commemorative practices have a great deal to do with the singularity of memory discussed in Chapter 1, the idea that only the legacy of White Finland and its ideological descendants are deemed worthy of remembrance. This includes a catalogue of historical figures associated with its “true national character”, whose graves have become something akin to pilgrimage sites to right-wing radicals and extremists in 21st-century Finland because of what their modern myths represent, ranging from patriotism to Russophobia to anti-communism.
Apart from the legacy of White Finland and its associated heroes and martyrs, the report also discussed the memorial to the victims of the 2017 attack, which serves as a recent example of far-right memory politics in 21st century Finland. Unlike the three cases of grave politics focused on the significance of certain historical figures, the memorial is more closely linked to the current far-right discourse of international terrorism and immigration, which frames the events of 2017 as an inevitable occurrence resulting from the perceived decline of traditional values and social order45. Yet the contested memory of the attack, crystallised in the annual far-right event 188-Kukkavirta to commemorate its victims and its counter-protest Turku without Nazis, shows that public displays of far-right activism are often not without a response from Finnish civil society, which challenges the far-right commemoration of the victims of the 2017 attack merely as an attempt to propagate far-right politics in Finland.
Whilst far-right groups have established similar memory and commemorative practices elsewhere in Scandinavia, the legacy of the Civil War is perhaps the most notable difference between Finland and its neighbouring countries46. In other Scandinavian countries, since no such conflict exists, what follows is that the notion of “cultural struggle” put forward by far right political actors in each of these countries is also somewhat different: in Finland, the Civil War serves as an important point of reference along the history of this struggle. Because of its particular importance, far-right groups have recently attempted to revive the tradition to commemorate the beginning of the Civil War, namely the “war of liberation”, every last Sunday of January, which highlights how historical commemorative practices, once independent of far-right association, can become exclusively associated with far-right memory politics of the 21st century. In the case of Civil War memorials, the same reverence for the legacy of White Finland can be observed.
As was stated in Chapter 1, far-right political actors can be understood as so-called memory entrepreneurs. Based on the discussion in Chapter 2, they can be further divided into memory entrepreneurs who create new references and those who enforce them47. To be sure, far-right and fascist activists in the 1930s were eager to create new references in support of their emerging ideological campaign, which already included the commemoration of controversial historical figures such as Bobi Sivén and Eugen Schauman. However, this can be contrasted by the far-right memory entrepreneurs of the 21st century, who can be seen as merely reinforcing these existing references – with the notable exception of the memorial to the victims of the 2017 attack – which serves as a product of contemporary far-right memory entrepreneurship. Although most other references, particularly those concerned with the legacy of White Finland and its associated heroes and martyrs, have already been established, it should be noted that their significance has changed over time and, since the end of the Cold War48, even increased due to the expansion of far-right memory entrepreneurship in Finland and elsewhere in Europe49.
To be sure, a major difference between the historical and contemporary far-right in Finland is that the former was able to operate openly by organising parades and other public events in the 1930s – much unlike the latter, argues Silvennoinen. He observes that the marginality of the contemporary far-right can notably be seen in their decreased, yet not necessarily any less significant, public presence: instead of large parades such as those in the 1930s, today’s far right activists gather in small numbers at someone’s grave to commemorate a little-known historical figure. Yet precisely because their gatherings have remained small, the narrative of their “victimhood” resulting from their marginalisation has persisted to this day, which might also explain their recent efforts to honour the legacy of White Finland and its associated heroes and martyrs in Finnish society. Despite the absence of popular support for far-right politics, however, these practices should be understood as having an impact beyond their measure, especially when high-profile politicians are involved50.
What do these findings leave us with? As peace educators, in acknowledgment of our past divisions, our mission is to empower present and future generations to combat these polarising trends and to reinforce a sense of unity and shared responsibility that resides in our diversity51. First, our work begins by recognising the plurality of memory, which calls for deepening our understanding of the past, including its growing presence in contemporary politics. The far-right’s efforts to instrumentalise the past should not only be a concern of historians, but also of teachers, scholars, educators and peace activists today. Second, critical analysis of far-right memory and commemorative practices is necessary to combat the singularity of memory to avoid further polarisation in Finnish society. At worst, such practices can reinforce glorified notions of the past and its disputed figures, through which far-right politics are normalised at the expense of increasing historical awareness. Third, because far-right political groups in 21st-century Finland operate less openly than they did in the 1930s, their resulting narrative of “victimhood” and identification with the past is particularly significant today, when far-right politics are once again gaining ground in Europe, including Finland where even members of the current Finnish cabinet have been associated with far-right views. Therefore, to ensure that the far-right’s efforts to instrumentalise the past go not without scrutiny, this report has attempted to shed light on far-right memory culture that continues to challenge the prevailing notion of the plurality of memory, because therein lies our duty of memory.
Notes
1 See Baun, Phillip. “Memory and Far-Right Historiography: The Case of the Christchurch Shooter.” Memory Studies 15, no. 4, (2022): pp. 650–665.
2 Couperus, Stefan, Lars Rensmann and Pier Domenico Tortola. “Historical Legacies and the Political Mobilization of National Nostalgia: Understanding Populism’s Relationship to the Past.” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 31, no. 2, (2023): pp. 253–267; see also Couperus, Stefan and Pier Domenico Tortola. “Right-Wing Populism’s (Ab)use of the Past in Italy and the Netherlands.” Debats. Revista de cultura, poder i societat 4, no. 2, (2019): pp. 105–118.
3 For the conceptual framework of lieux de mémoire, see Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 26, no. 1, (1989): pp. 7–24.
4Jelin, Elizabeth. State Repression and the Labors of Memory. Translated by Judy Rein and Marcial Godoy Anativia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (2003): 33–37.
5 See Vieten, Ulrike and Scott Poynting “Contemporary Far-Right Racist Populism in Europe.” Journal of Intercultural Studies 37, no. 6, (2016): pp. 533–540.
6 Zavatti, Francesco. “Making and Contesting Far-Right Sites of Memory. A Case Study on Romania.” Memory Studies 14, no. 5, (2021): pp. 949–970.
7 Kotljarchuk, Andrej and Francesco Zavatti. “Introduction: The Problem of the Online Memory Work of the Far-Right.” In: On the Digital Front-Line: Far-Right Memory Work in Baltic, Central and East European Online Spaces, edited by Andrej Kotljarchuk and Francesco Zavatti. Uppsala: Uppsala University, (2023): pp. 9–28. 8 The Finnish Intelligence and Security Service. “The Threat of Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism Has Grown in Western Countries.” https://supo.fi/en/extreme-right-wing-terrorism/. Accessed February 2, 2024; see also Kotonen, Tommi. “Terminological Games: The Finnish Security Police Monitoring the Far-Right Movements in Finland during the Cold War.” Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory 23, no. 1, (2020): pp. 54–70.
9 Teivainen, Aleksi. “Finland’s Supreme Court Orders Nordic Resistance Movement to Cease and Desist.” Helsinki Times, September 23, 2020, https://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/18102-finland s-supreme-court-orders-nordic-resistance-movement-to-cease-and-desist.html/. Accessed February 8, 2024.
10 Cf. Ricœur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (2004): pp. 86–92; see also Nora, Pierre. “Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory.” Eurozine, April 19, 2002, https://www.eurozine.com/reasons-for-the-current-upsurge-in-memory/. Accessed February 8, 2024.
11 UNESCO. “The Recommendation on Education for Peace and Human Rights, International Understanding, Cooperation, Fundamental Freedoms, Global Citizenship and Sustainable Development.” September 22, 2023, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000386924/. Accessed February 8, 2024.
12 See Assman, Jan. “Memory Culture: Preliminary Remarks.” In: Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2011): pp. 15–69.
13 von Soest, Christian. “Why Do We Speak to Experts? Reviving the Strength of the Expert Interview Method.” Perspectives on Politics 21, no. 1, (2023): pp. 277–287.
14 As translated by the author from Eskola, Seikko. “Valtiovallan tulisi juhlia sisällissodan lopputulosta.” Helsingin Sanomat, April 9, 2008.
15 As translated by the author from Lillqvist, Katariina. “Uralin perhonen.”
https://web.archive.org/web/20090106160144/http://katariinalillqvist.com/uralinperhonen.htm/. Accessed February 13, 2024.
16 Starck, Jeff. “Finland Scraps Centennial Coins After Design Uproar.” Coin World, April 28, 2017, https://www.coinworld.com/news/world-coins/finland-scraps-independence-centennial-coins-after-uproar.html/. Accessed February 14, 2024.
17 The term vapaussota, here translated as the “war of liberation”, has been disputed academically. See Hentilä, Seppo. Pitkät varjot: muistamisen historia ja politiikka. Helsinki: Siltala, (2018): p. 15; see also Perko, Touko. Kaksi vapaussotaa: Viha, vallankumous, terrori ja uuden alku 1905–1919. Jyväskylä: Atena, (2022): pp. 15–17. 18 Pesonen, Mikko. “Äärioikeistotutkija näkee nykyajassa merkkejä 1930-luvulta – ‘Vietetään tammisunnuntaita ja käydään Eugen Schaumanin haudalla kuin elettäisiin taas valkoisessa Suomessa.’” Yle, January 1, 2020, https://yle.fi/a/3-11104772/. Accessed February 13, 2024.
19 For a more comprehensive overview of the history of the Civil War, see Tepora, Tuomas and Aapo Roselius. The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy. Leiden: Brill, (2014).
20 Hentilä (2018): pp. 11, 49, 67–68; cf. Perko (2022): pp. 36, 38.
21 Hentilä (2018): p. 100.
22 See Silvennoinen, Oula, Marko Tikka and Aapo Roselius. Suomalaiset fasistit: mustan sarastuksen airuet. Helsinki: WSOY, (2016).
23 Kinnunen, Tiina. “The Post-Cold War Memory Culture of the Civil War: Old-New Patterns and New Approaches.” In: The Finnish Civil War 1918: History, Memory, Legacy, edited by Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius. Leiden: Brill, (2014): pp. 401–439.
24 Hentilä (2018): pp. 164, 181; Karcher, Nicola and Lundström Markus. “The Nature of Nordic Fascism: An Introduction.” In: Nordic Fascism: Fragments of an Entangled History, edited by Nicola Karcher and Markus Lundström. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, (2022): p. 3; Uola, Mikko. “Sinimusta veljeskunta: Isänmaallinen kansanliike 1932–1944.” Helsinki: Otava, (1982): p. 9.
25 Silvennoinen et al. (2016).
26 Peltonen, Ulla-Maija. Muistin paikat: vuoden 1918 sisällissodan muistamisesta ja unohtamisesta. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, (2003).
27 For more context on the history of fascism and its failure in Finland, see Silvennoinen, Oula. “‘Home, Religion, Fatherland’: Movements of the Radical Right in Finland.” Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies 4, no. 2, (2015): pp. 134–154.
28 This term was used by Finnish nationalists to emphasise the territorial expansion of Finland. For how this came to be, see Hentilä (2018): p. 158; Silvennoinen et al. (2016): p. 448; see also Kauhanen, Riku. “Katsaus valkoisten ja vapaussodan perintöön.” Ennen ja Nyt: Historian Tietosanomat 21, no. 4, (2021): p. 10.
29 Kauhanen (2021): pp. 21–22; for the Russo–Finnish War of 1939–1940, see Beck, Ethan. (2018) “The Winter War: Its Causes and Effects.” Channels: Where Disciplines Meet 2, no. 2 (2018): pp. 55–65. 30 Cf. Am, Ari-Ben and Gabriel Weimann. “Fabricated Martyrs: The Warrior-Saint Icons of Far-Right Terrorism.” Perspectives on Terrorism 14, no. 5, (2020): pp. 130–147.
31 Zaidi, Annie. “Grave Politics.” In: Bread, Cement, Cactus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2020): pp. 122–135.
32 Founded in 1922 in the wake of the failed Karelia expeditions, the nationalist Academic Karelia Society openly advocated for pan-Finnicism, including the idea of Greater Finland, and enjoyed considerable support from academics and university students until its disbandment in the aftermath of the Continuation War of 1941– 1944, the second Russo–Finnish War.
33 Silvennoinen et al. (2016): pp. 113–114.
34 Nieminen, Tommi. “Eugen-sedän teko.” Helsingin Sanomat, December 1, 2019.
35 Saloul, Ihab and Jan Willem van Henten. “Introduction.” In: Martyrdom: Canonisation, Contestation and Afterlives, edited by Ihab Saloul and Jan Willem van Henten. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, (2020): pp. 11–12.
36 Kangasalo, Olli. “Isänmaallisuuteen liitetty aihe tulkitaan rankasti uudelleen Aktivistit-tv-sarjassa – Eugen Schauman ja kumppanit olivat surkeata sakkia.” Yle, January 29, 2019,
https://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2019/01/29/bobrikovin-ampujalla-eugen-schaumanilla-ja-siskolla-insestinen-suhde ylen/. Accessed February 23, 2024.
37 Keskisarja, Teemu. “Ilman terrorismia ei olisi itsenäistä Suomea.” Yle, December 23, 2015, https://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2015/12/23/ilman-terrorismia-ei-olisi-itsenaista-suomea/. Accessed February 23, 2024.
38 Pohjonen, Juha and Oula Silvennoinen. Tuntematon Lauri Törni. Helsinki: Otava, (2013).
39 Cf. Hirsimäki, Tiina. “Niinistö: Lauri Törnin menneisyyttä ei ole siloteltu.” Yle, October 21, 2013, https://yle.fi/a/3-6893274/. Accessed February 22, 2024.
40 According to a Minority Rights Group (MRG) report on the status of minorities living in Finland, “Among far right groups and sections of Finnish society, there have been calls to halt immigration into the country. Anti migrant rhetoric has framed immigration, in particular refugees and asylum-seekers, as a driver of crime, a threat to Finnish values and an economic burden to the country – views that, while unfounded, are held by a significant number of Finns. According to a recent EU Fundamental Rights Agency survey, migrants and members of ethnic minorities are more likely to experience discrimination in Finland than in most other EU member states. In results published in 2017, nearly half of people of sub-Saharan descent living in Finland had experienced discrimination during the previous 12 months.” The report is available at:
https://minorityrights.org/country/finland/. Accessed February 6, 2024.
41 Rosendahl, Jussi. “Knife Attacker Sentenced to Life by a Finnish Court.” Reuters, June 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1JB14M/. Accessed February 7, 2024.
42 Kavander, Anni. “Tuleva elinkeinoministeri Junnila kommentoi kytköksiään äärioikeistoon: ‘Mitään suhdetta ei ole ollut alun perinkään’.” Yle, June 19, 2023, https://yle.fi/a/74-20037590/. Accessed February 7, 2024. 43 The independence march, known in Finnish as 612-marssi, is one of the many attempts of the contemporary far-right to claim certain memories – here the memory of independence celebration – and commemorative practices as their own. For pictures of the occasion, see Viitala, Silja and Anna Näveri. “Harvinaisen rauhallinen 6.12.” Yle, December 6, 2022, https://yle.fi/a/3-10542608/. Accessed February 22, 2024; see also Korhonen, Kuisma. “Politics of Fire: the Commemorative Torch Rally 612 of the Finnish Radical Right.” European Politics and Society 21, no. 3, (2020): pp. 307–322.
44 Available at https://www.ses.fi/en/catalogue/film/broken-dreamland/. Accessed February 22, 2024.
45 See Graef, Josefin. Imagining Far-right Terrorism: Violence, Immigration, and the Nation State in Contemporary Western Europe. New York: Routledge, (2022).
46 Oula Seitsonen, Paul Mullins and Timo Ylimaunu. “Public Memory, National Heritage, and Memorialization of the 1918 Finnish Civil War.” World Archaeology 51, no. 2, (2020): pp. 1–18; cf. Niklasson, Elisabeth and Herdis Hølleland. “The Scandinavian Far-Right and the New Politicisation of Heritage.” Journal of Social Archaeology 18, no. 2, (2018): pp. 121–148.
47 Michaël, Pollak. Une identité blessée: études de sociologie et d’histoire. Paris: Métaili, (1993). 48 The political marginalisation of far-right groups and organisations during the Cold War in Finland has been explored in Kotonen, Tommi. Politiikan juoksuhaudat: äärioikeistoliikkeet Suomessa kylmän sodan aikana. Jyväskylä: Atena, (2018). He concludes that despite the end of the Second World War, which saw the ban of all organisations deemed fascist according to the Paris Peace Treaties, the tradition of far-right activity in Finland never ceased overnight but instead continued in a number of underground organisations that operated during the Cold War.
49 See Zavatti (2023): pp. 949–952.
50 Crouch, David. “Rightwing Rant Exposes Tensions in Finnish Ruling Coalition.” Financial Times, July 27, 2015, https://www.ft.com/content/cd775e86-3460-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852/. Accessed February 29, 2024. 51 See Ahonen, Sirkka. Coming to Terms with a Dark Past: How Post-Conflict Societies Deal with History. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, (2012).